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first part evaluates the conduct to determine if it is discretionary. The
second determines whether the discretionary conduct is susceptible to
policy-related judgments. The district court held the Corps used discretion in determining where to place the dredged materials and in
constructing a concrete wall and silt fence. The United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit found no public policy issues required the
Corps to maintain a disposal site as they did, or to protect homes from
the indirect effects of the dredged materials.
Both the CWA and WQSR require a certificate or waiver before discharge of dredged materials. Montijo-Reyes alleged the Corps's failure
to obtain either a certificate or waiver caused damages to their property. The court held the WQSR did not prescribe any specific measures for disposal site maintenance. Further, the court held MontijoReyes did not show a causal connection between the Corps's failure to
get a water quality certificate or EQB exemption, and the damages to
their property resulting from the dredged material disposal.
The court affirmed the summary judgment holding in favor of the
Corps.
Amy M. Petri

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Bulen, 429 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Army Corps of Engineers complied with section
404(e) of the Clean Water Act when it issued Nationwide Permit 21
because it identified a category of activities, determined that those activities would have a minimal environmental impact both separately
and cumulatively, and provided notice and opportunity for public
hearing before issuing the permit).
A coalition of environmental groups brought this action against the
United States Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") and coal companies and associations over promulgation of a general permit under the
Clean Water Act ("CWA") for discharge of dredged or fill material into
waters of the United States. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit addressed whether the Corps exceeded its authority
under the CWA when it promulgated Nationwide Permit 21 ("NWP
21"). NWP 21 is a general permit for the discharge of dredged or fill
material into the waters of the United States that allows projects to
proceed only after receiving individualized authorization from the
Corps. The court concluded that the Corps complied with the CWA
when it promulgated NWP 21.
The CWA prohibits the discharge of any "pollutant" into the waters
of the United States without a permit. The Corps has the authority
under the CWA to issue individual permits and general permits for the
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discharge of dredged or fill material. The Corps issues individual
permits under section 404(a) on a case-by case basis, and general permits under section 404(e), which authorizes certain categories of activities. Section 404(e) provides that the Corps may issue general permits on a state, regional, or nationwide basis for any category of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill material if the Corps determines the activities are similar in nature, will cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately, and will have
only a minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment.
NWP 21 authorized discharges of dredged or fill material associated with surface or coal mining and reclamation projects. Here, the
coalition of environmental groups raised various challenges to NWP
21, which the district court did not address but rather held that NWP
21 is facially invalid under Chevron U.S.A. Inv. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc because it conflicts with the unambiguous meaning of
section 404(e). The appellate court, however, found that the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia decision
did not withstand scrutiny.
The court held NWP 21 plainly authorizes a "category of activities,"
which consists of those discharges of dredged or fill material that: (1)
are associated with surface coal mining and reclamation operations,
(2) are preceded by notice to the Corps, and (3) are approved by the
Corps after the Corps concludes that the activity complies with the
terms of NWP 21, and that adverse environmental effects are minimal,
both individually and cumulatively. Moreover, because NWP 21 incorporates the requirements of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, NWP 21 does not contain substantive requirements. Finally,
nothing in section 404(e) prohibits the use of procedural or substantive parameters to define a "category," and NWP 21 plainly sets forth
both substantive and procedural requirements and standards that apply to the activities it authorizes.
The court concluded that the Corps made the required minimalimpact determinations before issuing NWP 21. The Corps reasoned
that the activities authorized by NWP 21 "will not result in significant
degradation of the aquatic environment." Further, the court found
that issuance of a general permit functions as a guarantee ab initio that
every instance of the permitted activity would have only a minimal impact. The court concluded that the Corps's interpretation - that it may
use more tailored means to prevent adverse impacts on a project-byproject basis - was a permissible construction of the statute and was
reasonable. Moreover, it is impossible for the Corps's ex ante determinations of minimal impact to be anything more than reasoned predictions.
The court was convinced that the Corps made the minimal-impact
determinations required by statute after undertaking a good-faith
comprehensive, pre-issuance review of the anticipated environmental
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effects of the activities authorized by NWP 21. Further, its partial reliance on post-issuance procedures to ensure minimal impacts did not
make those determinations any less valid. Finally, the court concluded
that section 404 does not preclude the Corps from issuing a general
permit that contains a requirement of post-issuance individualized
consideration or authorization by the Corps.
The court of appeals vacated the judgment of the district court and
removed the injunction against NWP 21 authorizations.
Tracy M. Talbot

SIXTH CIRCUIT
City of Olmsted Falls, Ohio v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 435 F.3d 632
(6th Cir. 2006) (holding that (1) completion of airport expansion project did not render action moot; (2) Corps properly relied on Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency's waiver of its authority to act on
city's application; (3) the federal antidegradation rule only places obligations on states, not on Corps; (4) compensatory mitigation was an
acceptable form of mitigation to offset environmental degradation of
streams and creeks; (5) Corps's decision to issue permit was not arbitrary or capricious).
The City of Cleveland sought and obtained a "dredge and fill"
permit from the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") pursuant to Section 404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). The permit, which enabled
Cleveland to construct a new runway at Hopkins International Airport,
allowed Cleveland to fill and culvert 7,900 linear feet of Abram Creek
and some of its tributaries, as well as to fill 87.85 acres of wetlands. As
a precondition to its application to the Corps, Cleveland applied to the
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency ("OEPA") for certification of
the airport expansion pursuant to Section 401 of the CWA. After expressing some environmental impact concerns, OEPA expressly waived
its authority to act on Cleveland's Section 401 application.
The Corps issued Cleveland's Section 404 permit after accepting
OEPA's waiver, subject to extensive compensatory mitigation requirements on Cleveland. The permit's mitigation requirements mandated
that Cleveland either directly preserve or contribute financially toward
the preservation of 4,670 linear feet of Abram Creek, both upstream
and downstream of the airport, restore 265 acres of wetlands elsewhere, and contribute at least $1,782,000 to the restoration of nearby
streams. Upon issuance of the permit, Cleveland immediately began
construction. Olmsted Falls, a municipality down-river of the expansion project, filed suit challenging the permit on several grounds. The
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ruled that the Corps
correctly relied upon OEPA's waiver of authority, and entered judg-

